The ado around the polonium incident in London has a certain quirk to it which I find annoying. Why is everyone talking about the victims (real and potential) and piquant details of secondary importance, when there is something far more important to worry about?
Nuclear physicist Alexander Borovoi, a professor at the Kurchatov Institute research center, pinpointed my cause of concern: “The worst part of the story is that it was like a rehearsal for a dirty bomb. The incident shows that something dangerous is cooking in the terrorist kitchen, with menacing ideas and plans that can generally be described as a crime.”
“Litvinenko or one of his close friends have somehow got hold of polonium,” Borovoi said. “From them we can trace a connection to those whose dream is to get hold of a dirty bomb — terrorists.”
As Doug points out, Polonium-210 is used in conjunction with Beryllium-9 as a trigger for a suitcase nuke device. Add that fact to Alexander Litvinenko’s known connections to Chechen Muslim terrorists, and you have a recipe for horror:
While we busily connect the dots, we should first consider the possibility that Russia facilitated the transfer of nuclear weapons to al Qaeda through Kremlin-controlled Chechen terrorists. Secondly, we should keep in mind that the issue of missing nuclear material and devices, once thought to be urban legend, has yet to be satisfactorily explained and the locations of such materials and devices have yet to be verified. The gross contamination (by relative standards) of polonium-210 in the UK is the reason being presented by our media for the FBI assistance of Great Britain in their gross polonium-210 contamination scenario.
For this very same reason, this is why you won’t be hearing about the FBI involvement in their search for polonium-210 here on U.S. soil.